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The resource curse paradox is quite queer indeed however it can be explained simply. On 
one hand, there needs to be significant foreign investment and technology to exploit natural 
resources. On the other, state revenues from the sale of these resources on international 
markets are substantively less as compared to revenues from other productive activities. Both 
these circumstances, combined with little public monitoring, mean that multinational 
corporations, producing country governments, and specific interest groups use these 
contracts for their sole benefit to the detriment of the majority. 
To counter that, transparency initiatives in the extractive industry have become a norm rather 
than the exception to the norm. Various processes have been established internationally to 
monitor the disclosure of these contracts. These establishments have also been used to 
identify how the revenue from the extractive industry is being utilised. This study sought to 
investigate methods which can be used in the endeavour for more disclosure on contracts. 
 It sought to determine who the beneficiaries of such projects are and what contractual 
measures can be taken to identify and protect these third-party beneficiaries. It seeks to find 
out the safeguards to the environment and human health thus showing the necessity for 
companies to disclose their environmental costs and plans. To ensure accountability, this 
paper proposes certain checks and balances that should be implemented by governments 
throughout different stages in the mining projects thus maximising on the potential revenues 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
In a democracy, government exists to serve the people. The Kenyan Constitution captures 
this through article 1 on sovereignty of the people. Consequently, decisions and actions that 
government take are because of sovereign power granted to them by the people through the 
Constitution. In the process of governing, governments collect and stores information. Such 
information is a public good and should be available to the public.1 Dr. Odote aptly puts it, 
“In democracies, the government exists only to represent and act on behalf of the people. 
The information it gathers is done for the public benefit, with public funds, for public 
purposes. The collection, use, storage and retrieval of information are all carried out for the 
sake of the wider public good. People have a right to have access to that information; to 
seek it and to receive it.”2This therefore means that in Kenya, the people of Kenya, are the 
owners of all sovereign power3 and are the third-party beneficiaries to the contracts that exist 
in the extractive sector. Being beneficiaries of the contracts they have a right to access the 
information in the contracts.4Yet how can people who are not party to the contract stake a 
claim on it? Gathii introduces the Third-Party Beneficiary principle by stating that, ‘Under 
the Third-Party Beneficiary Principle, a contract between A and B for C’s benefit gives C 
standing to sue on such a contract. A third-party beneficiary contract arises when a promisor 
agrees with a promisee that a third party will receive the performance of the contract. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the third-party beneficiary principle either eliminates the 
need for privity or asserts that privity exists, by the party’s status as a third-party 
beneficiary.’5 This is establishing that for there to stand presence of a claim where the two 
parties agreeing to the contract acknowledge that a third party is bound to be the beneficiary 
of the contract. 
There is no shortage of data that’s likely to be generated in a modern mining operation and 
some may be justifiably proprietary or commercially sensitive. The real issue despite 
disclosure advancing into norm status is the asymmetric access to contract data as opposed 
                                                             
1 Odote C, ‘Access to Information Law in Kenya: Rationale and Policy Framework’, The Kenyan Section of 
the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ Kenya), 2015. 
2 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, ‘Our Rights, Our Information; Empowering people to demand 
rights through knowledge’, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2007. 
3 Article 1, Constitution of Kenya, (2010). 
4 Article 35, Constitution of Kenya, (2010). 
5 Gathii J, Incorporating the Third-Party Beneficiary Principle in Natural Resource Contracts, Published LLM 
Thesis, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, August 15, 2014. 
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to the unavailability of such data. The Constitution of Kenya in Article 62(2) vests the 
ownership of public land to the County government which holds in trust and administers this 
land. However, it vests all minerals and mineral oils are held by the National government 
and is administered by the National Land Commission.6 The Mining Act outlines in this 
regard, ‘Subject to Article 35 of the Kenyan Constitution and any other written law, all 
mineral agreements entered into in accordance with the Kenya Mining Act shall be public 
and be made accessible to the public. The Cabinet Secretary should ensure access to 
information including ensuring that mineral agreements and the status thereof are available 
in the official website of the Ministry. Further, the Cabinet Secretary should provide for 
accountable and transparent mechanisms of reporting mining and mineral related activities, 
including; revenues paid to the government by mineral right holders and production volumes 
under each licence or permit. These shall be published on the ministry website, annually 
with records, reports, mineral agreements and any other relevant information.7Thus the 
Third-Party Beneficiary principle can be applied in Mining extraction contracts.  
The practical realisation of human rights requires effective policies, laws and practical 
mechanisms that ensure access to information. Only access to timely and accurate 
information can empower the citizens of a country with the knowledge they need to 
scrutinise the policies that affect their human rights and the leverage to challenge the status 
quo.8 Officials negotiating on behalf of their governments may be even more careful to 
ensure they protect the public interest when they know the resulting deal will be made public. 
Publication can help build trust between contracting parties and society. It can avoid 
misperceptions around the contents of the agreements. This is important for government, but 
also for the mining company, which may become a local presence for decades. Publication 
enables broader analysis of the deal. Above all, it can facilitate more effective monitoring of 
contract implementation both by government and by third parties. 9 
1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM: 
When the public learns of big mineral discoveries, or hears that a major IMC has come to 
their country to negotiate a mining contract, public expectations can shoot through the roof. 
                                                             
6 Article 62(3), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
7 Section 119, Mining Act Kenya (2016). 
8 Odote C, ‘Access to Information Law in Kenya: Rationale and Policy Framework’, The Kenyan Section of 
the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ Kenya), 2015. 
9 The International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP), Open Oil, Revenue Watch Institute-Natural Resource 
Charter (RWI-NRC), and the Vale Columbia Centre on Sustainable International Investment (VCC): ‘Mining 
Contracts; How to Read and Understand them’ 2014, https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/mining-
contracts-how-to-read-and-understand-them.pdf on 25 June 2016. 
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There are many reasons for this, but political reasons dominate. Contracts between resource 
companies and governments are the fundamental documents that set out the key terms of 
agreement in many oil, gas, and mining investments. Among other things, contracts may 
include information on a project’s fiscal terms, local content, environmental impact, 
infrastructure, and production timing—information that is crucial for citizens to understand, 
monitor, and hold their governments and the investors accountable for their obligations. 
Moreover, disclosure helps ensure participatory approaches to benefit sharing.10 
The study aims to show a commercial perspective, both government and investors benefit 
from disclosure, as it promotes balanced deals. This can lead to increased investment 
stability, improved revenue collection and forecasting, decreased risk of renegotiation, and 
minimized risk of conflict and loss of social licenses to operate. It is key for the study to 
establish how to monitor arm’s length transactions.  
Finally regarding the identification of third parties, the Liberia - Putu (2010) Agreement, 
states regarding third party beneficiaries, ‘Apart from the government, the Company and the 
shareholder… no Person shall have any rights under this Agreement’. 11The provision stated 
above is significant in that it cuts off one potential avenue that individuals or communities 
may have otherwise could use to enforce contractual commitments made for their benefit or 
protection by governments and/or companies. This project thus seeks to show that a way of 
protecting inter-generational equity for third parties is by expressly stating it in the contract. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
i. To determine that disclosure of information requires adept information on 
compensation. 
ii. To determine that disclosure of information requires transparency.  
iii. To determine that proper checks and balances will ensure that a government is 
accountable to its citizens who indeed at the third-party beneficiaries to these 
contracts. 
                                                             
10 OGP Openness in Natural Resources Working Group : ‘Disclosing contracts in the Natural Resource sector’ 
(2016) 
http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/FIN%20OGP%20Issue%20Brief%20K%20Disc_0.pdf 
on 4 May 2016. 
11The International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP), Open Oil, Revenue Watch Institute-Natural Resource 
Charter (RWI-NRC), and the Vale Columbia Centre on Sustainable International Investment (VCC): ‘Mining 
Contracts; How to Read and Understand them’ 2014, https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/mining-
contracts-how-to-read-and-understand-them.pdf on 25 June 2016. 
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
i. What is the significance of access to information in the mining sector? 
ii. Are there any mining specific contracts that would be reasonable disclosed? 
iii. How can the rights of third parties be expressly protected in contracts? 
iv. What checks and balances can a government establish? 
v.  What is the effect of mining activities environmental degradation activities on the 
livelihoods of third parties? 
1.5 JUSTIFICATION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY: 
Transparency is the public disclosure of information about how mineral resources in a 
country are managed. Information that is disclosed in a manner that is timely and 
accurate manner is effective disclosure. This matter is a cross cutting one which can 
extend through different contexts; local content, revenues, mining operation, services to 
name a few.12 Full contract transparency will require a government to make all its 
contracts both past and present in all its extractive industries easily accessible to the 
public13 The Constitution of Kenya in Article 7114 has provided a check on the executive 
power by giving Parliament a vote on contracts dealing particularly with natural 
resources. While a country may have such a law in its books, it might not always be 
followed consistently. Governments are increasingly making contracts available but it 
can be said to be merely adhoc.15 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) have also given advice relating to the need for 
contract disclosure. The IMF’s Guide to Resource Revenue Transparency has reiterated 
the need for the disclosure of contracts.16It provided that  the best practices in this respect 
are: (i) standard agreements and terms for exploration, development, and production, 
with minimum discretion for officials, though these terms may vary over time; (ii) clear 
and open licensing procedures; (iii) disputes open to (international) arbitration; and (iv) 
                                                             
12 Alexander Manea, ‘Transparency and Accountability Africa Mining Legislation Atlas, World Bank 
Workshop, Accra, 16 December 2016 Available on PowerPoint. 
13 International Policy and Practice on Contract Transparency, 
 < http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI_Contracts_Confidential_Chapter_5.pdf> on 22 
November 2016. 
14 Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
15International Policy and Practice on Contract Transparency,  
< http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI_Contracts_Confidential_Chapter_5.pdf> on 24 
November 2016. 
16 IMF, ‘Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency’, 2005. 
< https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/grrt/eng/060705.pdf> on 11 December 2016. 
14 
 
disclosure of individual agreements and contracts regarding production from a license or 
contract area. 
According to an Amnesty International Report17, "Pollution and environmental damage 
caused by the oil industry have resulted in violations of the rights to health and a healthy 
environment, the right to an adequate standard of living (including the right to food and 
water) and the right to gain a living through work for hundreds of thousands of people’. 
This research focuses on the methods in which this principle of maximum disclosure can 
be expounded on given the transparency mechanisms as brought out in the Mining Act 
of Kenya. The Mining Act of Kenya deals with aspect of disclosure and in different 
stages of the mining process. The Mining Act further goes ahead to provide that the 
Minister should reveal mining revenues which undoubtedly would deal with any likely 
tax evasion tactics. The research aims to show that the rights of third parties are violated 
in cases of environmental pollution, loss of taxable income and in times when 
community negotiations are not done adequately. 
1.6 HYPOTHESIS:  
i. When contract disclosure follows the appropriate channels, rights of third parties are 
respected and protected. 
ii. If contracts are indeed broken down to their individual phases it is easier for the 
government and third parties alike to determine what sort of revenue it shall receive 
from the project. The taxable revenue can be used to improve the lives of the citizens. 
iii. Disclosure of Environmental management plans and costs are useful in establishing 
if a multinational is key on the socio-economic and environmental impacts of the 
project. 
1.7 LIMITATIONS: 
Time constraints, this project is submitted in partial fulfilment for the award of the Degree 
of Bachelor of Laws. The study therefore had to be limited within a few contract constraints. 
The nature of contract law is that is vast, the nature of contracts within the extractives sector 
is one which requires enough data on the subject matter. This implies that the study was 
limited due to an excess of ways that can be deciphered in our local laws which can protect 
third party beneficiary rights and therefore could not be fully expounded on. 
                                                             
17 Amnesty International: ‘Nigeria: Petroleum, Pollution and Poverty in the Niger Delta’, (Amnesty 
International), < https://www.amnesty.de/files/Amnesty_Bericht_Niger_Delta_09.pdf> on 4 January 2017. 
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1.72 PARAMETRES OF STUDY  
Mining Contracts in the past have been shrouded in secrecy. However today disclosure is no 
longer just an exception but a norm. The Oil and Gas industry is a good example of contract 
disclosure being the norm. However, although this paper will look mainly into the Mining 
Industry it can draw good examples from the Oil and Gas Industry. It will also limit itself to 
some case studies from the African Continent. 
1.8 DEFINITION OF TERMS  
i. Third Party Beneficiary: A third party who acquire contractual rights either if the contract 
expressly says so or where the contract purports to confer a benefit on him18 
ii. Transfer Pricing: Setting the price for goods and services sold between related legal 
entities within an organisation19 
1.9 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER: 
The consequence of exploitation contracts agreed upon between producing states and 
multinational corporations can be harmful to the common good. Little public monitoring 
coupled with low state revenues from the sale of these resources lead to a situation where 
specific interest groups pursue their own interest to the detriment of the majority. To combat 
this phenomenon the discussion on disclosure is one that is not new but needs to be 
considered in African states especially. This in turn will lead the way to protection of the 
people’s rights. Alternatively, the introduction of a third-party beneficiary principle into the 
extractive context matrix will ultimately lead to preservation and promulgation of these 
rights for third parties. 
  
                                                             
18 Sec 1&2, Contracts Rights of Third Parties Act 1999 UK. 
19 PWC, ‘International Transfer Pricing 2013-2014’, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/international-transfer-
pricing/assets/itp-2013-final.pdf on 4 December 2016. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
Before the 1980's the standard way of thinking concerning the relationship between having 
an abundance in natural resources and advancement was the previous was beneficial to the 
latter mentioned. Views for the fact that natural resource would empower creating nations 
to make the move from a work in progress to industrial take-off were advanced by Water 
Rostow.20A few financial experts tested these perspectives before the late 1980's, contending 
that the structure of the worldwide economy and the way of the universal product markets 
puts developing nations that were dependent on natural resources sends out at a genuine 
hindrance. Writings post this period have proposed something else. 
The likelihood that the natural abundance of resources will experience harsh negative 
externalities has been suggested and cannot be denied. The character of this externalities is 
such that it causes countries to experience negative economic, political and social 
outcomes.21 This literature has been extremely influential: the idea that natural resources are 
bad for development is now widely accepted by researchers and officials at the major 
international financial institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.22 
My theoretical framework of the resource curse which ultimately shows the relevance of 
access to information and relevant transparency and accountability mechanisms in the 
extractives industry will be seen in several perspectives. How can the blessing of an 
endowment of natural resource turn into a curse? How does the resource curse affect 
transparency and accountability mechanisms vis a vis disclosure of contractual information? 
What duty do multinational and governmental organisations owe the public in terms of 
access to information in combatting the resource curse? The explanations that have been 
advanced thus far, are from both the political and economic dimension. Generally, one can 
distinguish three subthemes in the literature debating both the root cause and the solution to 
                                                             
20 Mcneish J: ‘Rethinking Resource Conflict' (Documents.worldbank.org, 2010)  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/577611468163483076/text/620520WP0Rethi0BOX0361475B00
PUBLIC0.txt  on 20 November 2016. 
21  Bimal Chandra R, Satyaki S and Nikhil Ranjan M., 'Natural Resource Abundance and Economic 
Performance—A Literature Review’ Published Article, Current Urban Studies, Department of Architecture, 
Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, Ranchi, India (2013) 01. 




the problem; detrimental economic effects, the link between natural resources and violent 
conflict as well as the impact on governance and political institutions.23 
2.1 ECONOMIC LITERATURE: 
Revenue volatility comes through variations in production rates, fluctuation and increase of 
values in international markets. 24 The result of this as identified by economic literature is 
that there is a possibility of devastating shocks of a macroeconomic nature if a state is 
dependent on a single natural resource. Thus, the failure to resolve macroeconomic policies 
has had the effect of hampering the planning and creation of prudent fiscal and tax policies 
which has indeed led to a rise in debt accumulation and corruption. 25 
The most perceptible commitments start from Collier and Hoeffel, who moved the fixation 
from grievances and socio-political figures as essential driver for wars towards the thought 
of greed an instructive component. This argument presented highlights especially money 
related rousing strengths for conflicts given by the misuse of crude materials. They show 
that quantifiably, common riches are a strong and basic determinant of war onset. The 
organization of natural resources is undeniably essential in choosing the likelihood of 
conflict as well.26 Franke and Partners directed an observational examination on the resource 
conflict dynamic showing that it is very controlled by the nature of its administration. They 
found a noteworthy negative connection between good administration and the outbreak of 
contention. Sound monetary strategies and in addition socio-political game plans are key to 
lessen the impeding components mentioned previously.27 
2.2 GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Good governance is considered key to actively counter the resource curse.  Transparency 
initiatives through contractual disclosure and Anti-corruption measures have been 
commonly suggested to address the aspect of the resource. However, in the literature so far 
there have been few contributions providing evidence of the theoretical and practical 
                                                             
23 Mroß K, ‘Fighting the Curse by Lifting the Curtain; How Effective is Transparency as an Instrument to 
Escape the Resource Trap’, Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Duisburg-Essen, 
2012. 
24 Rosser A, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’: A Literature Survey IDS Working Paper, 2006, 
268. 
25 Coutinho L: 'The Resource Curse and Fiscal Policy' 
https://ucy.ac.cy/erc/documents/The_Resource_Curse_and_Fiscal_Policy.pdf  on 22 November 2016. 
26 Manobo Mushed S., Zulfan Tadjoeddin Mohammad, 'Reappraising the Greed and Grievance Explanations 
for Violent Internal Conflict’ SSRN Electronic Journal, (2007). 




significance of transparency. One of few papers explicitly addressing this relationship is by 
Kolstad and Wiig in 2009 who investigated the relevance of transparency to counter 
corruption in resource-rich states. They observed that “despite the popularity of the 
transparency concept, its role in reducing corruption and its importance in averting the 
resource curse are poorly understood”. Their empirical analysis on the matter it could be 
deduced that in a way of conclusion transparency can indeed reduce corruption.28 
The strength of government institutions before nations strike it rich is a key factor in 
differentiating between nations that are flourishing or that are cursed. In developing 
countries, which often pan out to be the most resource abundant, little is known by the public 
about how much money and at what point in time the nation receives from its oil and gas or 
mining operations. Even less is known regarding the matter on how much tax is paid by 
multinationals. The impact of this is that government officials can easily manipulate the 
figures and ultimately steal more from the citizens with far less accountability.29 
A recent study showed that 80 percent of the average earnings in developing countries come 
from extractable commodities.30 The importance of a trade balance needs to be stressed. This 
is because numerous resource rich nations import more than they export. This absence of 
monetary and economic diversification in a nations portfolio is presented negatively in a 
State’s financial development. The Dutch Disease is a follow up to this failure because it is 
found that such countries fail to promote a more competitive manufacturing sector.  31  The 
Dutch Disease phenomenon occurs when a country is overly dependent on its revenues from 
natural resources leading to an inflow of wealth from the sale of these resources. This has 
the effect of appreciating a country’s currency meaning that it becomes more difficult for 
the country’s other exports to be sold due to their pricey value. These problems results in 
long-term effects on growth by reducing the country’s economic diversity and increasing its 
dependence on nature resource exports32 
Special tax breaks given to mining companies in secret taxes or in mining tax laws has 
plagued African countries. Of note, Malawi, South Africa, DRC, Tanzania, Ghana and 
Zambia. In Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania, a report estimated that lower royalty rates 
                                                             
28 Rosser A, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. 
29 Mingcong L, ‘Corruption, Transparency and the Resource Curse’, 3 International Journal of Social Science 
and Humanity, November 2013. 
30 <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2012d2_en.pdf> on 17 November 2016. 
31 Mingcong L, ‘Corruption, Transparency and the Resource Curse’, 3 International Journal of Social Science 
and Humanity, (2013). 
32 Frankel J, 'The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey' SSRN Electronic Journal. 
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have cost or will cost treasuries up to US$68m, US$359m, and US$30m a year respectively. 
In Malawi and Sierra Leone, tax breaks granted in mining contracts have cost or will cost 
treasuries up to US$16.8m and US$8m a year respectively. In the DRC, the tax exemptions 
in a single mining contract have cost the treasury US$360,000 a year.33 
What has been the experience in the past is there was a nonexistence of authorities with the 
mandate to effectively enforce democratically and transparently promulgated rules which 
govern the operation and taxation of extractive activities. The quality of governance, 
legislative and policy processes determines if the people of a State that is endowed with 
natural resources will benefit from properly funded national development. This would 
require some changes from African states in terms of outlawing the use of confidential 
contracts which provide for special tax breaks which enable the companies to minimise the 
tax owed to the state and ultimately trickles down to a reduction of the revenue needed for 
development. 
Stiglitz's central point in his book on making globalization work, is that the resource curse 
is not inevitable. He suggests that for instance, ‘the IMF could shift from the usual 
developmental targets using GDP in making loan decisions which can be applied in the 
mining sector to Green Net National Product values’. Why? “First, GDP is a measure of 
aggregate economic production. GDP can go up even if most of the wealth leaves the 
country, leaving GNP - gross national product - the amount of money that stays within the 
nation - unimproved. Second, since GDP measures only aggregate economic output it fails 
to capture the fact that over the long-term projects that initially enhance GDP leave behind 
environmental degradation especially from extractive industries and are economically 
unsustainable as well”.34 
  
                                                             
33 Tax Justice Africa: ‘Breaking the Curse; How Transparent Taxation and Fair Taxes Can Turn Africa’s 
Mineral Wealth into Development’, Open Institute of South Africa Johannesburg & Tax Justice Africa Nairobi,  
March 2009 < http://www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/breaking-the-curse.pdf> on 9 January 2017. 
34 Stiglitz JE, ‘Making Globalization Work’, London Penguin Books ,2006. 
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY 
3.1 CONTRACT DISCLOSURE DURING COMMUNITY NEGOTIATION 
Third party beneficiary rights can be classified within the right to a clean and healthy 
environment, protection of the right to private property, economic and social rights and 
access to justice.35  Relying on Articles 3, 33(1) and 42 of the Kenyan Constitution, the 
counsel representing the amicus curiae on the issue on environmental degradation showed 
that any matter that would be impacting the environment would need to be continuously 
resolved. He also called to attention the Benefit Sharing Agreement in which issues which 
the community had wanted to be addressed but had been left out. Petition 34 of 201336 sought 
declarations with certain Constitutional implications including; A declaration that the 
County of Government of Kitui must be involved in the negotiations of the terms and 
conditions of the Coal Mining Agreement and, in particular, that the County Government 
must be involved in determining the appropriate levels of sharing of the benefits/profits of 
the Coal Mining Project; A declaration that the law requires that the Coal Mining Agreement 
must be approved by Parliament before its execution and a declaration that the Petitioners 
and the community ought to be involved in the negotiations for the Coal Mining Agreement 
as part of their right to participation.37 The arguments brought out in this case show the 
necessity of clear provisions guiding the rights of third parties. Additionally, this case 
demonstrates the need of disclosure of the rights and implications of all the parties involved 
which is both the government and the multinational corporation vis a vis the community 
interests.  
3.2 MULTINATIONAL TRANSPARENCY IN TAXATION 
Winnie Byanyima, Oxfam International’s Executive Director said: “Africa is 
haemorrhaging billions of dollars because multinational companies are cheating African 
governments out of vital revenues by not paying their fair share in taxes. If this tax revenue 
were invested in education and healthcare, societies and economies would further flourish 
across the continent.”38 According to UNCTAD, trade mispricing is just one of the ways 
                                                             
35 Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
36 Peter Makau Musyoka & 19 others (Suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the Mui Coal Basin Local 
Community) v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 14 others [2014] eKLR.  
37 Peter Makau Musyoka & 19 others (Suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the Mui Coal Basin Local 
Community) v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 14 others [2014] eKLR. 
 
38Oxfam International, ‘Multinational Companies cheat Africa out of Billions of Dollars’ Oxfam International, 
June 2015 <https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2015-06-02/multinational-companies-cheat-
africa-out-billions-dollars> on 6 January 2016. 
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multinational companies avoid paying their fair share of taxes., developing countries lose an 
estimated US$100billion a year through another set of tax avoidance schemes involving tax 
havens. 
The Payments to Governments report 2015, released by Glencore on June 2015 show it paid 
$5-billion to governments, of which $2 .86-billion was paid in taxes and royalties in relation 
to its extractive operations. 39 The largest sum, $867-million, was paid to the Australian 
government. The South African government was eighth in line and receiving $83.5-million. 
The commodities giant is based in the low-tax jurisdiction of Switzerland. Earlier in 2016 
Anglo American reported that in 2015 it had paid slightly more than $4-billion to 
governments, of which $862-million was paid to South Africa. Rio Tinto reported a total 
$4.5-billion paid to governments in 2015, $93-million of which was paid to South Africa, 
where its subsidiary, Richard’s Bay Minerals, operates. BHP Billiton paid $7.3-billion to 
governments last year. These disclosures were made in terms of a European Union 
transparency directive, which requires all large EU-listed companies to disclose certain 
payments to governments, country by country and project by project.40 
The Zambian Revenue Authority in 2011 prepared an audit of Mopani Copper Mines. In its 
findings, the report noted significantly that the operations conducted by Mopani Copper 
Mines had strategies which could be regarded as moving taxable revenue out of the country. 
This was coming from inconsistency in production volumes and costs that had been declared. 
The audit alleged that the transfer pricing activities in relation to sale of copper was not in 
accordance to the initial agreement as it was not an arm’s length transaction. It suggested 
that Mopani sold the copper at lower prices to its parent in Switzerland to take advantage of 
the ultra-low tax regime. 41  
What do these two contrasting results suggest about this issue on disclosure? It shows the 
role of two entities in this haemorrhage of funds; the government and the multinational 
corporation. Fiscal tools can be used by governments to improve the share of benefits 
accruing to the state trickling down to social spending, to diversify production, create jobs 
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on 6 January 2017. 
40 Steyn L, ‘How much do governments rake in? Mining giants come clean on taxes’ 
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and to mitigate other impacts. Tax makes rulers accountable to citizen taxpayers who also 
happen to be the third-party beneficiaries to this projects. Oxfam in its research has come up 
with a minimum guarantee that provides for a regional and or international tax floor that 
ultimately guarantees the minimum income to national governments as opposed to having 
to compete to a ‘race to the bottom on matters such as royalties and various safeguards.42 
3.3 POLLUTION AND HEALTH CARE CONCERNS THAT SHOULD 
NECESSITATE CONTRACT TRANSPARENCY AND DISCLOSURE 
In Kenya, research gave details of environmental influences of artisanal gold mining in the 
Migori Gold Belt in Kenya. It attempted to quantify the various additives to the environment 
and their health effects. ‘A conclusion was reached that the concentration of heavy metals, 
Pb (lead), As (arsenic) and Hg (mercury) at mine sites, stream sediments and water far 
exceeded the recommended values of the World Health Organisation (WHO). The 
concentrations of Pb and As in the Macalder stream were 13.75mg L-1 and 8.04mg L-1 
respectively against the WHO recommendation of 0.05mg L-1 for both metals. Poisoning 
from lead was particularly emphasised pointing out that it does not breakdown naturally but 
it impairs the nervous system, it affects foetus development, and it affects the IQ of infants 
and children’. 43 
Water pollution in Tarkwa Ghana is showing that a lot of the water sources are indeed 
polluted due to mining operations. Major pollutants included increased sediments, mineral 
reagents and spent chemicals. Cyanide spillages, Mercury leakages can be a burden to the 
residents because the ground water, farming land and resources in the water bodies are used 
a source of livelihood and a means of survival.44 
In Tanzania, a paper from the Journal of Cleaner production explained that environmental 
pollution is a major problem in the mining areas of Geita District. The welfare of groups of 
women and children was being severely impacted due to air and water contamination. The 
health and safety of mine workers and mining communities was identified to be in danger 
due to inhalation of mercury, water contamination and poor safety measures. In addition to 
that the pits that were left uncovered post the project were the breeding ground for agents 
                                                             
42 Lifting the Resource Curse; ‘How poor people can and should benefit from the revenues of extractive 
industries’, Oxfam International, December 2009. 
43 Ogola J, Mitullah W, Omulo M, ‘Impact of Gold mining on the Environment and Human Health: A Case 
Study in the Migori Gold Belt, Kenya’, University of Nairobi, Environmental Geochemistry and Health 2002. 
44Mwakwambirwa J, ‘Influence of Mining related factors on the livelihoods of resettled communities in Kenya: 
The Case of Titanium mining in Mswambweni division, Kwale County, Kenya’, University of Nairobi, 2015. 
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that spread water borne and air borne diseases. Buildings close to the mining pits have been 
damaged and have large crevasses on the wall due to constant vibration. 45 
In Zambia, toxic fumes were the cause of the death of a politician which sparked the interest 
on the contractual matter. Locals in addition had long complained of health problems after 
inhaling sulphur dioxide released by a Glencore subsidiary at the Mopani Copper Mines. 
The defence contested the claim citing that there had been an environmental indemnity 
agreement signed with the Zambian government in 2000. The duty of care by the mining 
company had been breached because sulphur dioxide emissions exceeded the legal limits.46 
In Kitui County in Kenya, water related impacts of fossil fuel extraction and refining in some 
areas leave the community with three basic choices; find an alternative source of water, treat 
the water before drinking it or drink contaminated water and risk adverse health outcomes. 
The water bodies of the Mui basin area are the greatest victims of coal exploration and 
studies on the impact of coal exploration on water bodies shallow well and borehole water 
quality assessment is usually neglected because of a general belief that it is pure through 
natural purification processes. 
  
                                                             
45 Kitula A: The Environmental and Socio-economic Impacts of Mining on Local Livelihoods in Tanzania: A 
case study of Geita District, 14 Journal of Cleaner Production (2006), 405-414 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
To understand the key issues at play, I shall analyse why access to information is key in the 
extractives sector and further explain how this provision can be implemented further. The 
analysis applied in the discussion also suggests ways in which Kenya can regulate this 
institution. 
4.1 WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE OF ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION IN THE MINING SECTOR. 
To answer the why,  the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa was 
adopted in 2002 by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in 2002 which 
underscored that “public bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians of the 
public good and everyone has a right to access this information.”47 An essential part of 
democratic governance in Kenya is ensuring that access to information is achieved.48The 
importance of access to information is also evident from the directions given to courts by 
Article 20(4) of the Constitution to ensure that in interpreting the Constitution they ensure 
that they do so in a manner that is consistent with an open and democratic society. An open 
society is one where access to information and transparency are basic and guiding hallmarks. 
The Constitution signals Kenya’s commitment to access to information. This is further 
buttressed by Article 10 on national values and principles of governance that commits all to 
the rule of law, democracy, participation, good governance transparency and accountability. 
Article 24 pinpoints that some rights and freedoms are indeed subject to limitation. It 
provides that the right of access to information, like all the rights in the Bill of Rights, can 
be limited by law, only to the extent that that limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, considering all 
relevant factors. 
The ideals of democracy and human rights are very closely intertwined; both emanate from 
the fundamental belief in the equality of all human beings who therefore have the right to 
make an equal contribution to their own governance and be equally protected under the law. 
The Commonwealth Harare Declaration of 1991 recognised this when Commonwealth 
                                                             
47 Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, 32nd 
Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 17-23 October 2002, Banjul, the 
Gambia. Available at <http://www.achpr.org/sessions/32nd/resolutions/62/> 
48 Article 35 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, stipulates that:  
“Every citizen has the right of access to information held by the state; and information held by another person 
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leaders stated their belief in: “the liberty of the individual under the law, in equal rights for 
all citizens regardless of gender, race, colour, creed or political belief, and in the 
individual’s inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political 
processes in framing the society in which he or she lives”. 
In 2004, a Joint Declaration on International Mechanisms for Promoting Freedom of 
Expression was released by the United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Speech 
and Expression, the Organization of American States and the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. This Declaration affirmed that “access to information is a 
“fundamental human right” for all citizens and stated that governments should respect this 
right by enacting laws that allow people to access as much information49 from them as 
possible which is the principle of maximum disclosure.” 50The Declaration also recognised 
how important access to information is for supporting people’s participation in government, 
promoting government accountability and preventing corruption. In October 2003, the UN 
General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), 
a comprehensive treaty which details various measures that state parties to the Convention 
should take to combat corrupt practices. The Convention explicitly recognises the central 
role that transparency and the right to information can take in ensuring government 
accountability by enabling the public to participate in the exposure of corruption. Article 13 
requires states to ensure that: “the public has effective access to information” and to 
undertake: “public information activities that contribute to non-tolerance of corruption, as 
well as public education programmes”. When individuals can demand access to official 
accounts and financial documents it becomes possible for them to identify the discrepancies 
between what a government has claimed to have spent on public works and projects and 
what it has spent.51  
In Kenya part of the realisation of proper access to information can be seen through 
legislation such as The Public Finance and Management Act. The Public Finance and 
Management Act incorporates access to information in public financial matters. The 
                                                             
49 The Public’s Right to Know, Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation’, Article 19   
<https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/righttoknow.pdf> on 10 January 2017. 
50 ‘Public bodies should, as a minimum, be under an obligation to publish operational information about how 
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51 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, ‘Our Rights, Our Information; Empowering people to demand 
rights through knowledge’, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2007. 
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Parliamentary Budget Office has as amongst its duties the responsibilities to comply with 
Article 35 of the Constitution by ensuring that documents, reports and other documents it 
produces are published and publicized within fourteen days of publication. The National 
Treasury, the Intergovernmental Budget and Economic Policy Committee, the county 
treasury, the county executive committee member for finance, and that for planning are all 
required to publicize information, all aspects of proactive disclosure of information. Section 
198 makes it an offence to conceal financial information, which may also be read to mean 
duty to provide accurate financial information.52 In the case of Nairobi Law Monthly Ltd 
vs. Kenya Electricity Generating Co. Ltd & Another53 the court stated that: - 
‘The right to information is critical to and closely interlinked with the freedom of 
expression and of the media, and indeed with the enjoyment of all the other rights 
guaranteed under the Constitution.’... ‘State organs or public entities ... have a 
constitutional obligation to provide information to citizens as of right under the 
provisions of Article 35(1)(a). ..... They have a duty under the relevant legislation 
about the information and reports that they should provide. However, they cannot 
escape the constitutional requirement that they provide access to such information 
they hold to citizens’. 
The UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has been spearheading the 
development of a Mining Vision for Africa and is leading the development of best practice 
guidelines for African governments to ensure that their mining laws protect the environment 
and communities while maximising the remittances from mining companies to government 
budgets in a transparent and accountable way. 54As discussed above access to information is 
a recognised human right. Through it members of the public will be able to note 
discrepancies in actions in which the government is either failing or lacking to perform its 
fiduciary duty to the people. In Kenya, minerals are defined as public land. This public land 
is held in trust for the people of Kenya by the County Government and administered by the 
National Land Commission.55Given Kenya’s exponentially growing extractive industry 
many contracts will be gotten into for the exploration of certain minerals. It is thus with 
                                                             
52 Dr Odote C, ‘Access to Information Law in Kenya: Rationale and Policy Framework’, The Kenyan Section 
of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ Kenya), 2015. 
53 Nairobi Law Monthly Company v Kenya Electricity Generation Company & 2 Others [2013] Eklr. 
54 Tax Justice Africa: ‘Breaking the Curse; How Transparent Taxation and Fair Taxes Can Turn Africa’s 
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upmost importance that the legislation and implementation surrounding access to 
information of the activities being carried out is readily availed.  
To better understand resource management and to bring additional stability contract 
disclosure is vital. In the long term, it will assist governments renegotiate better deals 
because the information asymmetry with the companies has been set. In shorter terms. 
Governments will easily enforce the contracts. The fact that the contracts are now available 
to the public gives government officials a set incentive to negotiate better deals due to 
incompetence or and corruption. The complexities of extractive agreements will be 
simplified for the general public. Transparency of contracts goes ahead in ensuring stable 
and durable contracts which is a necessary element in promoting sustainable use, 
management and development of resources.56  
Kenya’s drafting of confidentiality clauses may limit access to information but should learn 
from international best practice examples. Take for instance the Denmark’s Model License 
of 2005 for Exploration & Production of Hydrocarbons which recognizes that the public 
interest in information should outweigh the company’s interest in confidentiality states: 
“[Information can be disclosed if] no legitimate interest of the licensee requires the 
information to be kept confidential; essential public interests outweigh licensee’s 
interest in maintaining confidentiality; information of a general nature is furnished 
in connection with issuance of public statements” 
Access to information is important in understanding the connection between the interrelated 
points in resource development. 57 Each point beginning from the need to exploit resources, 
to exploration, revenue collection and ultimately state expenditure on revenues presents key 
pick up pints where the ‘value chain’ can be utilised better for the public. This picture painted 
in which there is transparency in the entire value chain and involves meaningful citizen 
participation will ensure equitable and sustainable use of the funds and the resources.  58 
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The resource curse is where natural resource exporting countries tend to underperform 
economically, have non-democratic governments as well as poor governance, are plagued 
with corruption and have a higher propensity of involvement, in some cases, in conflict59.It’s 
been classified into two categories; the “Dutch Disease” and the “Nigerian Disease”.60 The 
former is where there is reallocation of resources towards the primary product at the expense 
of the manufacturing sector, here the government has a rent seeking behaviour instead of 
ploughing back proceeds to develop other non-resource sectors like agriculture, resulting in 
slow economic growth and an increase in unemployment since the resource sector typically 
employs few people61. The latter on the other hand is characterized by resource revenues 
being wasted by governments who lack the institutional capacity to use these windfall gains 
efficiently; therefore, what features prominently here is corruption and rent seeking 
behaviours. 
One of the shortcomings to transparency is where disclosure of information to the general 
populace of a country does not in itself imply the possession of the ability to process the 
disseminated information. All public bodies should be required to establish open, accessible 
internal systems for ensuring the public’s right to receive information. Generally, bodies 
should designate an individual who is responsible for processing such requests and for 
ensuring compliance with the law. Further, the possession of information is of no use if 
agents are unable to punish abuses of that office,62 thus the need to support and strengthen 
the concept of accountability through civil society. Transparency should address upstream 
activities such as procurement. Transparency in contractual arrangements is an important 
step towards revenue transparency, as confidentiality harbours secrecy and 
corruption,63Governments contract on behalf of its citizens, thus the need to disclose the 
contents of such contracts to its citizens who conferred upon it such powers and ensure 
adequate checks and balances are in place.64  
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 4.2 HOW DO YOU ENSURE ACCESS TO INFORMATION? 
4.2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY RIGHTS 
The first step is actually ensuring those who require this information can expressly identify 
their protection. One of the protections that can be accorded to third parties who are either 
influenced by poor tax policies or environmental degradation post extraction is through the 
express intention that can be claimed in a contract. In the discussion, earlier in the paper, the 
first reasoning for a third-party beneficiary claim to a contract would be in relation to a 
contract whose performance is for the benefit of the third party. To further protect these 
rights a contract can specify the third party who is to benefit from the contract expressly. 
Disclosing contracts is one of the most emphasised point on countries that are part of the 
EITI.65 Members of a class or answering to a particular description could create very wide 
categories of third parties in construction. This would include the rights protected under 
Article 70 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. Article 70 provides that a third party who 
alleges that their right to a clean and healthy environment has been violated can seek redress 
and additionally does not have to demonstrate any suffered injury. The nature of extractives 
transactions is also applicable under third party rights as further outlined under Article 71 of 
which transactions are to be ratified by Parliament if it involves a grant of a right or 
concession on behalf of the people of Kenya for the exploitation of natural resources. The 
Contracts(Rights of Third Parties Act) 1999 provides that, ‘once a third party has a right to 
enforce a term, to prevent the contracting parties agreeing to rescind or vary the contract 
in such a way to extinguish or alter the rights of third parties unless the third party has 
consented in certain circumstances which are; where the third party has communicated his 
assent to the term to the promisor, the promisor is aware that the third party has relied on 
the term, the promisor can reasonably be expected to have foreseen that the third party 
would rely on the term and the third party had actually relied on it’.66 This means that for 
the express term to prevail, before the third party's rights are "crystallised", either the third 
party should be aware of the express term; or  one or more parties to the contract should take 
reasonable steps to make the third party aware of the term.67 To give practical examples of 
the rights of third party rights developments in other industries, the construction industry is 
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of note. The principle provides certain rights to the owners to directly enforce subcontracts 
without the need for collateral warranties. In the employment industry, rights to third parties 
ensures that dependants of employees can enforce terms under an employment contract 
which confers a benefit for example medical insurance or repatriation benefits to the 
dependant. It also enables employees seeking to enforce terms of a secondment agreement 
between an employer and a related company within a group, or the employer and a third 
party (client or industry/ governmental body).68 
The Third-Party Beneficiary Principle should be one of the background rules against which 
contracts for negotiation of extractive resources should be conducted. Thus, even if 
beneficiary communities are unable to pursue remedies in court the recognition of the Third-
Party Beneficiary Principle would likely influence the negotiation of contracts by requiring 
parties to consider the rights and interests of the community. It is my opinion that the Third-
Party Principle is key in the transparency and accountability front given that contracts lay 
down the foundation upon which natural resource extraction occurs an issue that requires 
attention is the private international law remedies that can be attained.  
The EITI standard holds that countries are encouraged to publicly disclose any contracts or 
licenses that provide terms attached to the exploitation of oil, gas and minerals.69 We’ve also 
determined that access to information and contract disclosure is need a prerequisite for third 
parties for them to be able to access justice. How then can the disclosure of contracts happen 
given that many multinational corporations will claim confidentiality issues? 
 
 
Figure 1 Transparency Pyramid- Legal Framework. 
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To illustrate that contracts do not exist in a vacuum consider the overarching legal framework 
in a pyramid perspective. This hierarchical framework has its base founded in the 
Constitution. The Constitution should provide information that protects the fundamental 
values and rights of every citizen and may include the answer on who owns the natural 
resource. The next layer constitutes of the laws and policies that govern the industry; in the 
case of Kenya this is the Mining Act 2016 and the Petroleum Bill. The next layer provides a 
more specific front by setting for regulations that are more like specific requirements in the 
application of the law. The final layer of the pyramid is the contractual layer. This layer 
serves as a ceiling which all the layers of the pyramid are reflected. The strength of a contract 
is thus envisioned in the constitution then rooted in the law and subsequently supported by 
the regulations. 70 
Section 119 of the Mining Act71, is subject to Article 35 of the Constitution72 and any other 
written law, provides that all mineral agreements entered into in accordance with this Act 
are to be public and be made accessible to the public. “The Cabinet Secretary is to ensure 
access to information under, including ensuring that mineral agreements and the status 
thereof is available in the official website of the Ministry for the time being responsible 
for mining. The Cabinet Secretary is meant also make Regulations to provide for 
accountable and transparent mechanisms of reporting mining and mineral related activities, 
including-revenues paid to the government by mineral right holders and production volumes 
under each licence or permit. The Cabinet Secretary publishes on the ministry website, 
annually, records, reports, mineral agreements and any other relevant information”. The 
hierarchy of information by virtue of these mechanisms provided can be followed. 
Countries considering publishing contracts should ideally look to publish these documents 
in their “full text” form, as is encouraged by the EITI Standard. The reason for this is that 
publishing the full text, including the relevant signatures, represents the strongest path for 
countries to realizing the benefits of disclosure: increased trust among citizens, companies 
and government; ability to monitor compliance and enforcement; ability to maximize 
usefulness of revenue data; and enhanced incentives to sign contracts in the long-term public 
interest. 
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4.2.2 CONTRACT TRANSPARENCY REGARDING FINANCIAL AND 
TECHNICAL RESOURCES 
Technical resources underpinning a mineral resource announcement should be disclosed at 
the time that the estimate is announced, which is when investors would be expected to be 
making investment decisions. On 5 October 2011, the ASX Group (ASX) commenced a 
comprehensive consultation process with the release of, ASX Listing Rules Review Issues 
Paper: Reserves and Resources Disclosure Rules for Mining and Oil & Gas Companies‟ 
(ASX Issues Paper). The report showed that a clear majority of the commenters supported 
annual disclosure and reporting requirements on resources, reserves and aggregate holdings. 
The report further provided that companies would need to identify material changes that 
resulted from their actions on the projects and an aggregation of costs showing the 
differences between estimations of projections past.73 This would come in handy in 
transparency and accountability in exploration licenses and renewal licences. 
In the Peter Mui case, the Petitioner asked for relief for the Petitioners and the Community 
based on an alleged contravention of Article 10 of the Constitution in the award of the tender 
to explore, exploit, or develop the Mui Coal Basin Blocks C and D and specifically that the 
award was done in secrecy, without due diligence to confirm the awardee’s technical 
capabilities and in a manner devoid of public participation as envisaged in the Constitution.74 
Contracts represent the agreement between the government and the extraction company 
about how, when and at what cost the extraction occurs. They represent the “deal” the 
government gets in exchange for mineral rights. When contracts remain secret, citizens and 
oversight actors cannot properly monitor the implementation of the deal, and the country is 
at high risk of corruption and leakage.75 The fact that so many contracts remain secret 
reinforces a culture of impunity in which public officials are not held accountable for 
questionable deals they make. Contract transparency is crucial in ensuring that laws are 
followed, country benefits are maximized, and communities are reassured that the 
government is acting in the public interest. 
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The Mining Act of Kenya provides that the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the 
National Treasury may enter a mineral agreement with the holder of a mining licence where 
the proposed investment exceeds USD 500 million.76  It is a requirement protects third party 
beneficiaries by ensuring that the investors and companies in charge of extractions have the 
technological and financial capacity to undertake the contract bona fide. Governments and 
companies can always agree to publish contracts and they can agree to modify the 
confidentiality clauses to allow for contract transparency.  Even when the parties do not 
agree to make any information public, confidentiality clauses in extractive industries 
contracts almost always include an exception for disclosures that are required by law.  This 
is the other way governments can require contract transparency by law. 77Any information 
that is highly sensitive can always be redacted prior to disclosure78.  
4.2.3 CONTRACT TRANSPARECY THROUGH IDENTIFYING 
FINANCIAL RESOURCES APPLICABLE IN EACH MINING PHASE 
WITHIN DISCLOSURE RULES. 
The Cabinet Secretary should indeed make Regulations to provide for accountable and 
transparent mechanisms of reporting mining and mineral related activities, including-
revenues paid to the government by mineral right holders and production volumes under 
each licence or permit.79 To promote transparency and accountability, the Cabinet Secretary 
should prescribe rules after completion of each mining stage. There the discussion that will 
follow will identify what happens at each phase. Evaluation, means that post exploration 
which happens in phase one it is determined whether a mineral resource has technical 
feasibility and commercial viability. It determines the volume and the grade of the deposits, 
surveys transportation and infrastructure requirements while conducting the necessary 
market and finance studies. In stage four which is production, the mineral reserve is extracted 
and processed for sale on a commercial scale. By the fifth phase which is closure and 
rehabilitation, the operations have entirely ceased and the site is being restored and 
rehabilitated. It is important to have an overview of why this phases are important because 
the phases often overlap and sometimes even simultaneously. This means that the accounting 
                                                             
76  Section 117, Mining Act of Kenya (2016). 
77  Natural Resource Governance Institute, ‘Contract Transparency’ Natural Resource Governance Institute 
< http://www.resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/contract-transparency> on December 5 
2016. 
78 Natural Resource Governance Institute, ‘Contract Transparency’ Natural Resource Governance Institute 
<http://www.resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/contract-transparency> on December 5 
2016. 
79 Section 119(3), Mining Act Kenya (2016). 
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costs for the project will overlap as well. This shows that it is not always easy to determine 
at what point to cut-off costs between the various phases.80 
Now that it has been established that the identification of points to cut off costs may be 
difficult, I shall go through what costs run through these phases that can indeed be monitored. 
The first two phases which are exploration and evaluation determine that the costs of 
exploration are for discovering mineral resources while the costs of evaluation are for 
proving the technical feasibility and commercial viability of any resources found. The nature 
of the resource through the calculation of its estimate reserve value is such that it should 
benefit the society. The importance of disclosure of such documents is that a proper review 
can be done to the commerciality of the resources found.81 
Phases two and three interloop occasionally, the cut-off between evaluation and 
development is therefore often a critical accounting issue. The cut-off point is once the 
technical feasibility and commercial viability of extracting the mineral resource has been 
determined. A Bankable Feasibility study is undertaken and then a decision on whether there 
is indeed commercial viability to be able to develop is made by the directors. The Bankable 
Feasibility study will go ahead to establish an availability for financing and will identify the 
existence of markets which will be vital for the long-term contracts that shall be signed.  
Phases three and four deal with development and production. Research has shown that to 
determine the cut-off point between the two is rarely simple. However, it is important to 
recognise that the change from development to production means that costs can no longer 
be capitalised as recoverable and should be treated as operating expenses and will no longer 
be capitalises upon by the mining company. Thus, more taxable revenue that can be 
submitted to the governments. 
The accounting treatment of exploration and evaluation expenditure can have a fundamental 
impact on the financial statements of a mining entity, particularly for junior mining 
companies with no producing assets82. The IASB Framework for the Presentation of 
                                                             
80 PWC, ‘Financial Reporting in the Mining Industry, International Financial Reporting Standards, 6 edition, 
http://docplayer.net/2136634-Financial-reporting-in-the-mining-industry-international-financial-reporting-
standards.html on 7 December 2016. 
81 Energy, Utilities & Mining, Financial reporting in the Mining Industry, International Financial Reporting 
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Financial Statements (‘the IASB Framework’) defines an asset as “a resource controlled by 
the entity because of past events and from which future economic benefits are expected to 
flow to the entity’. It states that an asset should be recognised when: it is probable that future 
economic benefits will flow to the entity (which can be through commercial exploitation of 
a mineral deposit, or sale of exploration/mining rights); and the asset has a cost or value 
that can be measured reliably.”83  
In determining the treatment of exploration and evaluation expenditure under the IASB 
Framework, an entity must determine the ‘unit’ to which costs should be allocated. Within 
the mining industry, the most common approach is to allocate costs between areas of interest. 
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS Standards), in IFRS 684  the 
definition of exploration and evaluation expenditure only begins to apply to expenditure 
incurred after the entity has obtained the legal rights to explore in an area. Assets that are in 
respect to exploration activities can be recognised as assets in the instance that an entity has 
substantial knowledge of the mineral deposit in question and has gone ahead to construct 
infrastructure and the facilities which would be needed to exploit those resources he expects 
to find if there has been a proven history of returns to the amounts that are spent and are 
going to be spent.  
4.2.4 CONTRACT TRANSPARENCY THROUGH PROPER CHECKS AND 
BALANCES BY THE GOVERNMENT.  
Under section 101 of the Mining Act, a statement of the financial and technical resources 
available to the applicant to carry out the proposed mining operations and to comply with 
the conditions of the licence should be provided to the relevant authorities.85 The IFRS 6 has 
previously determined that a mining company should be able to identify a policy which 
would specify its expenses on exploration and evaluation and apply that system consistently. 
86The International Accounting Standard 18 recognises revenue once all the significant risks 
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and rewards have been transferred to the purchaser and once that is done the Government 
can realise if a policy is consistently being used for the people of Kenya as they can identify 
the costs and the probability of further economic benefits. 
The type of contracts that are common in the mining industry are such that producers and 
buyers will enter long-term sales contracts. These contracts will secure supply and 
reasonable pricing arrangements and thus are important to a mining entity in determining 
whether to move to the production stage. 87 Stabilization clauses within such contracts 
protect the producer and/or the seller from significant changes to the underlying assumptions 
they had agreed upon at the time of signing the contract. Additionally, the clauses relating 
to price adjustment may vary based on world market prices, cost escalation of another form 
of price index indicator. If a long-term contract results in continuing losses because pricing 
and other contract terms cannot be changed, associated capitalised mine expenditure may 
not be recoverable.88 
An entity only recognises a provision for a loss in relation to an individual contract if the 
unavoidable costs of meeting the obligations under the contract exceed the economic 
benefits expected to be received under it. Many mining contracts will permit periodic 
adjustments if circumstances change, particularly as long-term relationships between 
producers and buyers are becoming more important as global demand for minerals increases.  
If an onerous contract exists whereby product is supplied to a third party on terms that cannot 
yield a profit, associated assets such as the underlying mine is written down prior to 
recognising any provision for loss.89 Due to there being no future economic benefit for its 
value, a mine is written-off. After such depreciation of value, the remaining loss is the lower 
of the cost between fulfilment and penalties payable to exit the contract. The gains or loss 
arising from derecognising an asset are included in profit or loss when it is derecognised. 
Any gains are thus classified as income. Therefore, the terms of the contract need to be 
reconsidered before the provision for onerous contract is recognised to consider terms that 
                                                             
87 ‘Energy, Utilities & Mining, Financial reporting in the Mining Industry, International Financial Reporting 
Standards, 2007’ <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/energy-utilities-mining/pdf/ifrs-mining.pdf> on 26 December 
2016. 
88 PWC ,’Revenue from Contracts with Customers; The standard is final – A comprehensive look at the new 
revenue model’, 2015 < https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/in-depth/2014-01-revenue-from-
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89International Accounting Standard 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets < 
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will result in recognition of ways which the third parties benefit from the gains of such a 
contract.  
The government must ensure that the management of a mining entity must make the 
following disclosures: the accounting policy adopted for the recognition of revenue 
including all aspects − for example, shipment terms and provisional pricing; the amount of 
each significant category of revenue recognised during the period including revenue arising 
from the sale of goods, the rendering of services, interest, royalties and dividends and the 
amount of revenue arising from exchanges of goods or services included in each significant 
category of revenue. 90  
Many mining companies report on environmental issues affecting their operations as part of 
their operating and financial review in the annual report and/or in separate sustainability or 
corporate responsibility reports. Transparent reporting mechanisms for this are necessary 
because due to the nature of the work mining involves, damage to the environment can be 
damaged for a long-term basis and thus adequate compensation measures must be identified 
at the beginning of the contract term including provisions on the use of water. 
Petition 305 of 201291 asked for prayers for an alleged breach of or the likely violation or 
infringement of the right to a clean and healthy environment contrary to Articles 42 or 70 of 
the Constitution based on the apprehension that the methods to be deployed in the coal 
mining would lead to environmental degradation and the threat to health contrary to Article 
43 of the Constitution from the effects of coal mining. 
4.2.5 CONTRACT TRANSPARENCY IN REPORTING FINANCIAL DATA 
BY MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
The nature of the natural resource extractive industry is such that the natural resource which 
is extracted is not under the ownership of the extracting company but to the country which 
they were extracted from. The submission given by the Publish What You Pay to the 
International Accounting Standards Board alluded to the fact that this given as a justifiable 
reason by governments to levy higher forms of contributions from companies in the 
                                                             
90 ‘Energy, Utilities & Mining, Financial reporting in the Mining Industry, International Financial Reporting 
Standards, 2007’ <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/energy-utilities-mining/pdf/ifrs-mining.pdf> on 26 December 
2016. 
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extractives. This would indicate why governments would not like to disclose details on a tax 
concession it has with a multinational company. 
The reason behind this could be to erase the general ideology that the way tax law is 
administered in the country is not just and equitable. Additionally, it may be used to conceal 
the fact that some multinational companies negotiate lower tax liabilities for secret gain by 
some government officials. Some may argue that governments do not wish to weaken their 
bargaining power in future negotiations who would be seeking similar treatment if the 
information is disclosed. This situation identifies above can be solved through valuation of 
the profits that are accrued by the mining entity. 92 The problem that arises is that it is difficult 
to value the transfer pricing at which some transactions happen. Valuing the pricing of more 
sophisticated assets that may be trading between associated mining entities may not be 
simple if they are unique and therefore there is no similar information in the market, this in 
turn will mean that it would be hard for the government to identify the arm’s length price for 
such transactions. To value the amount of profit arising from such a country ends up being 
difficult if such transfer pricing means are underway. 
If there is a perception that payments made by multinational corporations may be misused, 
or not properly accounted for by governments, the central case for greater transparency 
concerns the value of those payments. The payment portfolio to governments is diverse and 
includes but is not limited to corporate income tax payments, royalties, the charge given for 
the right to exploit those natural resources. The goal should be therefore to identify how to 
make public all those payments.93 A good example on transparency initiatives came through 
the amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, which made it mandatory for companies in the 
extractive sector listed in the United States to publish all their payments to governments 
country by country, was legislated in the United States.  
To hold governments to account, it is argued that there should be disclosure of total payments 
made to each government. But to hold companies to account, it would in principle be 
necessary to identify whether the amount of tax due has in fact been paid.94In the first place, 
                                                             
92 Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, ‘Review of Comparability and of Profit Methods; Revision of 
Chapters I-III of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines’, July 2010, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, < https://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/45763692.pdf> on 2 January 2017. 
93 OECD Observer  
<http://oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/3132/Corporate_responsibility_and_paying_tax.html>on 
3 January 2017. 
94 Devereux M, ‘Transparency in reporting Financial Data by Multinational National Corporations, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation (July 2011),   
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even if commercial profits were known, the complexity of tax law properly applied, the 
allowances and reliefs available and timing issues make it very difficult to know the amount 
of tax due, and for a variety of reasons the tax paid in a year may not bear a strong 
relationship to the tax due with respect to the commercial profits earned that year. 
It is important to note that developing countries face an asymmetry in information. The 
taxpayer in their jurisdiction will be typically a subsidiary of the multinational group, so 
when audited and required to provide information to the tax authority it may be able to 
respond only for itself, for it often has no legal ability to compel the production of 
information in the possession of affiliates in other territories which are third persons.95  One 
quite extensive example of the public disclosure that might be required from a multinational 
company to satisfy the accountability objective has been put forward by the Task Force on 
Financial Integrity( TFFI). 
TFFI proposed the following as disclosure requirements for each multinational company:  
“The name of each country in which it operates, the names of all its companies trading in 
each country in which it operates, what its financial performance is in every country in which 
it operates, without exception, including: its sales, both third party and with other group 
companies, purchases, split between third parties and intra-group transactions, labour costs 
and employee numbers, details of the cost and net book value of its physical fixed assets 
located in each country, details of its gross and net assets in total for each country in which 
operates.” 96 
The fiscal and public agencies governing the extractive sector in many African countries are 
weak and porous. In many cases, companies enjoy excessive tax incentives, which is 
exacerbated by extensive unethical tax avoidance, transfer mispricing and anonymous 
company ownership schemes. To address this weakness, and after decades of responding to 
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95 Devereux M, ‘Transparency in reporting Financial Data by Multinational National Corporations, Oxford 
University Centre for Business Taxation (2011),   
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96 Murphy R, ‘Country by Country Reporting Holding Multinational Corporations to account wherever they 
are, Task Force; Financial Integrity & Economic Development’, (2009),  
<http://www.financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Final_CbyC_Report_Published.pdf> on 
29 December 2016. 
40 
 
externally driven transparency agendas, African governments embraced the Africa Mining 
Vision (AMV) in 2009 as one of its pillars is fiscal regime and revenue management.97 
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CHAPTER 5: EFFORTS BY KENYA IN ENCOURAGING ACCESS 
TO INFORMATION TO THIRD PARTIES 
The Kenya Ministry of Mining launched their official Cadaster Portal (or register) to enable 
government to regulate and obtain value from mining operations. Some of the things the 
newly launched cadaster will help the government in doing include: formally recording all 
applications for various types of licences and issues tittles for these licenses, registering all 
changes to the title, checking against overlapping with existing claims or other impediments 
and advising the Ministry whether the application is technically sound and if the license 
payments have been done. The portal also initiates the procedures for modifying or 
cancelling a license if needed, maintaining a register and a map of the licenses as a technical 
reference in case of dispute and it will also facilitate submission of statutory fees for licenses. 
The Online Transactional Mining Cadaster Portal (OTMCP) is a web-based e-Government 
system through which participants in the Kenyan mining industry will be able to interact 
with the Ministry to: view licenses or permit details and application status in real time, 
submit and manage electronically the application for granting renewals and other business 
processes, submit digital documents to meet reporting requirements and also to submit fee 
payments via credit card or mobile money. 
In addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) team is pushing the Kenya government 
to make public details of a number of deals it has signed with oil exploration and mining 
firms. Keeping in mind that Kenya has so far only committed to implementing the EITI but 
is not a candidate country nor is it compliant. But officials on the IMF team disclosed that 
the government has denied them access to the documents, a fact that can only leave Kenyans 
guessing how the country is faring in regard to the exploration and exploitation of minerals. 
It found that the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources “treats these agreements 
as confidential and did not release them to the mission.”98 
. 
  
                                                             




CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 TO THE GOVERNMENTS: 
1. To break the resource curse and turn mineral wealth into revenue for development, 
the laws, the policies and the institutions that govern financial payments made by 
mining corporations to national governments need to be reformed. 
2. Most tax codes or mining agreements require prices in such transactions to be at the 
same price as a company would obtain in an "arm’s-length" transaction. But 
determining the arm’s-length price and monitoring such transactions can be 
challenging. To assist governments in this respect, some mining agreements contain 
provisions requiring reporting of such transactions, documentation of the basis of the 
arm’s-length prices used and, in some cases, a certification from a company officer 
about such prices.99 
3. The practice of granting tax exemptions to mining companies in mining contracts 
should cease. Whichever mining tax rates and terms used should be legislated in the 
substantive laws and not only in the development agreements. 
4. Country legislation should push for a new international accounting standard that 
would force companies to report on their profits, expenditures, and taxes, fees and 
community grants paid in each financial year on a country-by country basis. 
5. Sometimes an estimate of the minerals’ value in the mining jurisdiction may be 
agreed ahead of time by the government and the company in what is called an 
"Advanced Pricing Agreement" (APA). 100Rather than the government checking 
costs shipment by shipment, both sides agree on a method of doing the valuation to 
save themselves the trouble of arguing over it later. APAs are generally not included 
in the mining contract itself, although the contract could require the company and 
government to make one before production starts. 
6. They must demand that such companies comply with the highest international 
standards in the social, humanitarian, and environmental spheres. 
                                                             
99 The International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP), Open Oil, Revenue Watch Institute-Natural Resource 
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6.12 TO THE ACCOUNTING BOARD 
1. To the International Accounting Standards Board Adopt a new international 
accounting standard for extractive industries, which require them to report on their 
profits, expenditures, and taxes, fees and community grants paid in each financial 
year on a country-by-country basis. 
6.13 TO BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DONORS  
1. Scale up their financial assistance to African governments to improve their capacity 
to monitor and audit the accounts of mining companies, and to review their mining 
tax regimes. African governments should be free to use this finance to purchase legal 
and other technical assistance from any service provider of their choice. 
2. Detail the use of fiscal incomes from extractive industries within national and local 
budgets and development plans, in both the short and medium terms (i.e. for 
mitigating health and education or environmental impacts in exploited areas) and the 
long term (i.e. for productive diversification and to reconstruct sources of livelihood 
in exploited areas).101 
3. OECD countries and international donors should establish and apply transparency 
and corporate responsibility criteria for the companies they support through their 
Export Credit Agencies (ECAs).  They should respect and adhere to OECD 
guidelines and UN standards for multinational companies, as well as the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention and the UN Convention against Corruption; and consider the 
possible proposal of an OECD convention on transparency and reporting for 
multinational companies. ECAs should have in place policies requiring disclosure of 
payments and contracts, independent monitoring of projects, and assurance of 
minimum governance conditions before financing projects.102 
6.14 TO THE THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES 
1. When one of these non-parties is harmed because of mining operations, and sues the 
government and/or company for relief, the contract should often specify who will 
wind up ultimately paying for any compensation. These are called "indemnification 
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“clauses, and are used by contracting parties to decide how to allocate liability 
between themselves and should be included in these contracts. 
2. Legislation should contain a provision in its mining law requiring the mining license or 
contract holders to negotiate and enter Community Development Agreements (CDAs) 
to facilitate the transfer of social and economic benefits to local communities. CDAs can 
help define the relationship between mining companies and impacted communities, 
including the roles of local and national governments and nongovernmental 
organizations.103 A careful CDA will probably specify the timing of contributions, the 
use to which each contribution is to be put (or the process for allocating funds to specific 
uses) and a vehicle for the management of the contributed funds. They also provide a 
framework for community interactions with the mining company (and potentially local 
government entities) across the whole range of matters that may concern the local 
community.  
6.2 CONCLUSION: 
My hypothesis that when contract disclosure follows the appropriate channels, rights of third 
parties are respected and protected has been proved. Kenya needs to ensure that its legislative 
framework on the extractive industry provides access to information on contracts that affect 
the lives of its beneficiaries and does indeed facilitate access to justice as envisioned by 
Constitution. The contracts governing the relationships in the extractives sector is one that 
has implications to the growth of a country’s revenue, its environmental and economic costs 
should be regulated through a consistent policy. Governments play a supervisory role in 
ensuring that the rights of third parties who are to benefit from these contracts are protected. 
Establishing a method in which contracts can be supervised after every stage of an extractive 
operation will serve as the best checks and balances system to ensure that multinational 
organisations and governments alike are perpetually under scrutiny thus facilitating access 
to the benefits of these resources. A further study into disclosure raises the issue if, and to 
which extent, disclosure should be voluntary, and if voluntary how could it be made more 
effective. 
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